| topic: | Political violence |
|---|---|
| tags: | #Israel, #Lebanon, #Hezbollah, #ceasefire, #pilot zones, #displacement, #peace process |
| located: | Israel, Lebanon |
| by: | Joe Zimbler |
Five months after the US, Israel and Lebanon signed a framework to end the cross-border conflict sparked by the Hamas-led 7 October attack, its pilot zones have stalled. As a new Israeli government takes shape, the deal can still deliver – if Israel gives the Lebanese army room to operate and the international community finds a credible way to disarm Hezbollah.
The Trilateral Framework Agreement signed by the US, Lebanon and Israel in June aimed to end the cycle of violence that followed the Hamas-led 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and the Gaza war. After the attack, Hezbollah began launching strikes at Israel, beginning a conflict that has seen thousands killed and displaced on both sides of the border. The idea was this: Israel and Lebanon pick initial sites, called ‘pilot zones’, for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to exit, while the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) enter to ensure the demilitarisation of Hezbollah and facilitate the return of civilians. Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed armed group designated a terrorist organisation by the US, the UK and Canada, among others; the EU lists its military wing as such. By working together, both sides can ensure their collective safety and establish peace. The LAF now controls security in the pilot zones, areas affected by IDF military operations. It is worth noting that Israel never held these villages, unlike other areas of southern Lebanon that remain under IDF control.
During talks in Rome from 4 to 6 August, Lebanon hoped to expand the pilot zones across the south to areas that Israel was holding. Instead, Israel flatly refused.
Nimrod Goren, president of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, attributes this rejection to politics: there is an ‘unwillingness … to make any compromises that involve major territorial withdrawal before elections’, Goren told FairPlanet in a video interview.
While Goren’s theory explains Israel’s objection to expanding the zones, other steps could have been taken, such as choosing a neutral country to verify Hezbollah’s disarmament. Other than agreeing on a shortlist of countries to carry out this vital task, nothing has materialised.
Further, each country has not held up its end of the bargain. Lebanese and Israeli sources have reported that Hezbollah operatives maintain a presence in the pilot zones, despite Lebanese pledges to disarm the organisation. Meanwhile, the IDF continues to strike targets across the south, such as Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, which is adjacent to one of the pilot zones, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah. In Zawtar al-Gharbiyah itself, the IDF infiltrated and built an ‘earthen barrier’ in early August, although since then, there has been no reported IDF activity inside the pilot zones.
These actions risk derailing the fragile trust that exists between the two governments. That trust is already on a knife’s edge; despite the trilateral framework’s implementation, civilians are still being killed, including a Lebanese man on 11 October who was entering olive groves in Bint Jbeil and an Israeli teenager on a school trip the following day.
As of 29 September, over 300,000 Lebanese remain displaced, while the most recent statistics from 2025 place the number of Israelis displaced at around 9,000, down from the 96,000 displaced after 7 October 2023. And with the Lebanese and Israeli governments failing to carry out the trilateral framework, Hezbollah is stepping in. Ali Damoush, head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, announced in October that eligible families in Beirut and its southern suburbs will receive $14,000, while other affected families across the country will receive $12,000. The finances are believed to come from Iran, which reportedly sent $200 million to Hezbollah to help displaced families.
But despite Hezbollah’s financial allotment and the Lebanese government’s inability to provide running water to Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, support for Hezbollah’s armed role is waning, even among its Shiite base. According to The Media Line, almost two-thirds (66.4 per cent) of Lebanese Shia now want Hezbollah’s weapons handed over to the state – a striking turnaround from mid-2025, when only 27 per cent said only the army should hold weapons, according to Gallup. The same Gallup survey found that among Lebanon’s other major communities – Christians, Druze and Sunnis – close to 90 per cent support placing all weapons under the army’s control.
Yet, if casualties continue to grow, and the Lebanese government is unable to support citizens’ needs, an opportunity will emerge for Hezbollah and Iran to win back support. For months, Lebanese citizens have been stating their impatience with the government and army. One civilian in the pilot zone complained to Shafaq News in August: ‘It is our duty to stay here and defend our land. Instead of guarding Israel, the Army should cooperate with the resistance [Hezbollah] so Israel withdraws from our villages.’ And despite the army’s efforts, Hezbollah operatives are still present in each of the pilot zones. The Lebanese government’s failure to disarm the group, combined with a continued lack of resources for civilians, risks creating the conditions for Hezbollah’s return and a resumption of hostilities with the IDF.
A prolonged Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon is a strong possibility, given statements by Israeli government officials. In late July, a communique by Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that ‘the IDF will remain in the security zone in southern Lebanon and will continue to destroy any terror infrastructure in order to prevent any attempt by Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities’. Then, during a visit to the Israeli-held zone on 14 August, Katz said, ‘I have instructed the IDF to take all necessary steps to prepare for a long-term presence in the area.’ If Iran’s reported $200 million transfer to Hezbollah is any indication, the group is rebuilding – and may already be crossing the red lines set by the Israeli government.
A future Israeli government could behave differently from the one headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That future may be approaching quickly: on 8 November, President Isaac Herzog tasked Gadi Eisenkot, a former IDF chief of the general staff, with trying to form a government. Yet Eisenkot is the author of the Dahiya doctrine, or ‘a military doctrine intent on inflicting severe damage on their opponent’s infrastructure and civilian centers to achieve deterrence and avoid getting dragged into wars of attrition.’ This doctrine was first used during Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah, when, in response to the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers, Israel began a 34-day military operation.
Regardless of who becomes the next Israeli prime minister, public pressure is on Israel to maintain forces in Lebanon. This June, a poll found that ‘most Israelis support buffer zones and oppose withdrawals without security guarantees’. Any agreement with Lebanon would be unpopular without addressing Hezbollah’s remaining capabilities.
Instead of public persuasion, some argue American pressure could force the Lebanese and Israeli governments to act. American military aid is vital to Israel’s military, while the US has sent billions in financial aid to Beirut over the last two decades. Yet American influence can only go so far; Israel’s leaders ultimately respond to its voters, not Washington.
Ultimately, this agreement may convince Israel to remain in the roughly 6 per cent of Lebanese territory that the IDF controls. Other than opening dialogue between the Israeli and Lebanese governments, which in itself is a real win, very few changes for civilians have been seen. Pitched by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun as ‘a final opportunity to secure a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire’, the agreement was viewed through an all-or-nothing lens and represents a gamble for everyone involved. If it fails, some Lebanese and Israeli citizens, using the undermined deal as proof that dialogue is impossible, may drift towards more extremist elements, namely Hezbollah and far-right actors in the Israeli government. The status quo would become more entrenched than before the Trilateral Framework’s formation.
A return to full-scale war remains possible. But before then, there is still time for true peace. Each side must take a leap of faith; Israel must give the LAF more breathing room to operate within the pilot zones, while the global community must come together and find a credible way to disarm Hezbollah. Improving the lives of Lebanese people in the south is the best way to protect them and Israelis living along the border, as Hezbollah’s self-claimed role as guardian and financier would be undermined. The Lebanese government, if it comes down to it, will have to take risks to defeat Hezbollah – something it can no longer avoid. And Israel will have to let them. That’s the only way to peace. But it remains to be seen if they will try.
