| October 16, 2026 | |
|---|---|
| topic: | Human Rights |
| tags: | #Hungary, #public media, #media freedom, #Viktor Orbán, #Central Europe, #Visegrád Group, #press freedom, #Poland, #Slovakia, #Czechia |
| located: | Hungary |
| by: | Robert Bociaga |
On the afternoon of July 7, Hungary’s evening news never arrived.
At 4 p.m., M1, the country’s main public television channel, went dark. Instead of the usual programming, viewers saw a black screen and an apology: public media had lied for years and would now be reformed to become independent and trustworthy.
The gesture marked a dramatic break with the past. But dismantling a propaganda system is easier than building an independent one.
Since Orbán came to power in 2010, Hungary has become one of Europe’s most closely watched examples of media concentration, with the government consolidating public broadcasting and politically aligned owners acquiring private outlets. In 2018, more than 470 government-friendly media outlets were brought together under the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), a move that the European Commission said increased the risks to media pluralism.
Since Péter Magyar’s government took office in May 2026, Hungary has become a different kind of test case: whether institutions can be redesigned to restore public trust after years of political capture. In July, the new government suspended news broadcasts on M1 and began restructuring the public-media system, including replacing its management and creating new rules for oversight and financing.
Hungary’s newly adopted reforms represent one of the region’s most ambitious attempts to redesign public media governance.
The new framework replaces direct political control with a nine-member board: three government, three opposition and three professional representatives, aiming to prevent any single political force from dominating oversight.
Whether that succeeds, however, depends less on the architecture than on the people who occupy it.
'If they are experts and feel responsible for the operation of public service media, then this system can work well,' Gábor Polyák, a media scholar, said in written responses to FairPlanet’s questions. 'A CEO with a clear European vision can be appointed.'
Yet Polyák is far from unreservedly optimistic.
Because the board must approve major financial decisions while appointing the chief executive, political deadlock could make routine management difficult. In Hungary’s deeply polarised political environment, cooperation cannot be taken for granted, Polyak warned.
The reforms leave questions over who qualifies as a professional organisation and whether parties will nominate experts or loyalists. Polyák sees the system as an institutional experiment whose success will depend on political culture as much as legal design.
Poland is another example of how difficult that experiment can become.
Following Poland’s 2023 elections, the new government moved rapidly to replace the leadership of public broadcasters after eight years of rule by the Law and Justice (PiS) party. Yet nearly three years later, the reform process 'have been effective only to a limited extent,' Mateusz Obremski, a foreign correspondent with a focus on the struggle for press freedom, told The FairPlanet.
'There are significantly fewer cases of blatant propaganda, but I would not argue that Polish public media have been fully depoliticized,' he added.
Instead, he argues, the transition exposed structural weaknesses that transcend partisan politics. Public media companies continue to operate under liquidation status, creating uncertainty over financing and even affecting journalists personally, including difficulties obtaining mortgages or loans.
'The problems are systemic,' Obremski said. 'Journalists should be at the centre of the entire process.'
His assessment highlights a broader regional lesson: changing management may take weeks; rebuilding durable institutions may take years.
Jakub Jaraczewski, Senior Research Coordinator at Democracy Reporting International, told The FairPlanet in an email that the debate often begins with the wrong question.
The challenge is not whether one political party governs more responsibly than another, he argues, but whether institutions can remain independent regardless of who wins the next election.
In Hungary, civil-society groups and legal experts have questioned whether the rapid overhaul of Orbán-era institutions could set precedents future governments might exploit. In June 2026, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee criticised the government for allowing just five days of public consultation on sweeping constitutional changes, while Human Rights Watch warned that rushed amendments could undermine the rule of law.
Jaraczewski acknowledges the tension.
He says escaping political capture requires 'a legally sound route' that restores oversight without weakening the rule of law. He points to an independent regulator, secure funding, judicial oversight and politically insulated appointments.
'What happened in Hungary and Poland with regard to media freedom was made possible, among other things, by the government exercising full political control over the constitutional court,' he said.
Without genuinely independent courts, he argues, even well-designed media laws remain vulnerable.
The struggle over media independence extends beyond public broadcasters. Polyák argues that many pro-government outlets relied on state advertising as 'covert state support,' giving independent media an uneven playing field.
'The state should not interfere in the functioning of the market,' Polyák said. 'If state advertising disappears, commercial rates will rise, and there is a chance that the market distortions of the previous period can be overcome.'
The reforms also coincide with the implementation of the European Media Freedom Act, which introduces new EU-wide safeguards on state advertising, ownership transparency and editorial independence. Together, Polyák argues, legal reform and changing market conditions could reshape not only public broadcasting but Hungary’s wider media ecosystem.
Whether Hungary’s reforms can become a Central European model remains uncertain. Jaraczewski sees the EU, rather than the Visegrád Group, as 'the only reliable avenue for regional cooperation on media freedom'. Obręmbski nevertheless sees value in cross-border exchange, especially as disinformation and hybrid threats grow.
Weak public broadcasters, he warns, create space for poorly regulated online information ecosystems without the editorial standards or accountability of established news organisations.
Still, Hungary’s reforms offer a reason for cautious optimism. If the new system can protect public media from political interference across electoral cycles, Hungary could offer something more than a cautionary tale: a model for rebuilding media independence after political capture.
By copying the embed code below, you agree to adhere to our republishing guidelines.