WILL ETHIOPIA’S INTERNAL CONFLICT DRAW THE HORN OF AFRICA?

On 23 September 2026, daily life in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region was thrown into disarray. Employees at Alula Aba Nega Airport in the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle, were on their way to work when their supervisor called the driver to say that Tigrayan forces had taken over the airport.

‘He [the supervisor] told us to return home,’ one of the employees told AFP.

That morning, fighting erupted when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) seized three airports in the region and launched a major offensive against the federal government in coordination with six other armed groups it had joined three days earlier to form the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, which seeks to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

This latest fighting shattered the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that ended the devastating 2020–2022 war between the TPLF and the federal government, which resulted in an estimated 600,000 deaths and displaced more than two million people. The roots of the war go back to 2018, when Abiy became Ethiopia’s prime minister. In 2019, Abiy dissolved the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front – a coalition dominated by the TPLF – and merged most of its member parties into the new Prosperity Party, which the TPLF refused to join.

The move sharply reduced the TPLF’s influence. The TPLF first emerged as an armed movement in the 1970s. It fought Ethiopia’s Marxist military junta, known as the Derg, played a crucial role in toppling it in 1991 and dominated the country’s politics for nearly three decades before Abiy took office.

On 2 November 2022, Abiy’s government and the TPLF signed the agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, followed by implementation negotiations in Nairobi. Brokered by the African Union (AU), the agreement called for an immediate ceasefire, the disarmament and demobilisation of Tigrayan forces and unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray.

Adam Daud Ahmed, a Horn of Africa political and security analyst, told FairPlanet in an email that while the Pretoria Agreement did end the war, it left underlying issues unresolved. Divisions over governance and political control, security arrangements, displaced populations and disputed territories, he said, led both the federal government and the TPLF to violate the agreement.

‘Ending active hostilities is not the same as resolving the underlying causes of conflict. The agreement was designed to end a specific conflict, but Ethiopia’s wider political and security challenges extend beyond that war,’ Ahmed said. ‘Tensions involving Fano [an Amhara militia] and other armed groups, debates over governance and political representation, and broader questions about the country’s political future still require attention.’

For instance, the TPLF is still aggrieved over western Tigray, which Amhara forces seized during the last war. Amhara, a region bordering Tigray, has long claimed the area. Many Amhara contest its incorporation into Tigray when the TPLF-led government redrew Ethiopia’s internal boundaries in 1992. Now, the TPLF wants western Tigray back, and wants the hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans driven from the disputed territory to be allowed to return.

Regional risk

Until 2020, Ethiopia was the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. However, the renewed fighting in Ethiopia has stoked fears of potential escalation into a wider regional conflict in the Horn of Africa, a region already plagued by instability and armed conflict.

‘The most significant regional risk involves Eritrea,’ Ahmed told FairPlanet.

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have long been fraught. The neighbours were on cordial terms after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in May 1993, but a border war between 1998 and 2000 split them, killing tens of thousands and displacing 650,000 people.

While a peace agreement signed in Algiers, Algeria, on 12 December 2000 ended the war, the two countries remained in a ‘no war, no peace’ stalemate until Abiy took power and made peace with Eritrea in 2018, a move that earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.

Relations broke down again when Ethiopia expressed a desire to take control of Eritrea’s Red Sea ports of Assab and Massawa and to base an Ethiopian navy there. Ethiopia lost direct access to the sea when Eritrea gained independence.

The search for sea access led Ethiopia to sign a memorandum of understanding in January 2024 with Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia in 1991 but whose independence only Israel has recognised. Ethiopia reportedly promised to recognise Somaliland’s independence in exchange for access to a 20-kilometre stretch of coastline on the Gulf of Aden for 50 years.

The deal angered Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its territory, and it threatened war. Turkey mediated, and Ethiopia and Somalia signed a joint declaration in Ankara on 11 December 2024 to respect each other’s territorial integrity.

Ethiopia, the world’s most populous landlocked country, relies heavily on Djibouti’s port for the overwhelming majority of its imports and exports, earning Djibouti an estimated US$400 million a year in port fees alone.

Martin Plaut, an analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa and co-author of Understanding Ethiopia’s Tigray War, believes Djibouti’s port alone cannot handle Ethiopia’s trade. ‘To have just one major access point for a nation the size of Ethiopia is not a great idea,’ Plaut told FairPlanet in a video call.

‘A longtime enemy’

The fighting has also revealed new alliances. Although Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia in the 2020 war against the TPLF, it has since allied with the TPLF. Eritrean soldiers were seen driving through a northern Ethiopian town on 7 October, witnesses told Reuters.

‘This alliance comes with a price; both sides want something in return,’ Plaut told FairPlanet. Eritrea gains a ‘buffer’ on its border, he explained, while the TPLF could use Eritrea’s border to export illicit gold mined in Tigray.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting the TPLF. Ethiopia said the Sudanese army harbours thousands of Tigrayan fighters, who are said to have fought alongside it against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In turn, Sudan accused the Ethiopian government of allowing the RSF to operate from its territory, train in camps there and launch drones into Sudan. Ethiopia denied these allegations.

Egypt’s standoff with Ethiopia, Plaut said, is mainly about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydroelectric power plant on the Blue Nile, which Egypt says threatens its water security.

‘Egypt is a longtime enemy of Ethiopia, not because they dislike the Ethiopians but because of the Nile. More than 90% of Egypt’s water comes from the Nile,’ Plaut said. ‘The Egyptians have been tremendously fearful of this [dam], and they have moved heaven and earth to try and stop it. [But] they failed in the end.’

Ahmed fears these interconnected issues in the Horn of Africa might disrupt trade, worsen humanitarian conditions and further destabilise the region.

‘Ethiopia’s internal conflicts, unresolved political grievances, and deteriorating relations with neighbouring countries could increasingly reinforce one another,’ he told FairPlanet. ‘If these dynamics converge, they risk creating a broader regional crisis.’

Promoting peace

The renewed fighting in Ethiopia has sparked concerns over potential humanitarian crises in the country. At least 52 civilians were killed in the first three days of fighting, and more than 150,000 people have been displaced as of 28 September 2026.

‘[The fighting] comes at the worst possible time,’ Plaut said. ‘People are desperately in need of outside assistance, even without a war.’

As fighting continues, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the European Union and the United Nations have called for de-escalation. The AU has also asked former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU’s High Representative for the Horn of Africa, to engage the parties and resume talks within the framework of the Pretoria Agreement.

Beyond these efforts, Ahmed said Ethiopia must prioritise tackling underlying issues.

‘Over the longer term, Ethiopia will need a broader and more inclusive political process that addresses governance, representation, security concerns, displacement, and unresolved grievances,’ Ahmed told FairPlanet. ‘Any sustainable solution must provide peaceful mechanisms for addressing political disagreements and restoring public trust.’